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1 Introduction
Suppose that the interaction between a number of asymmetrically informed parties
is governed by a mechanism which is designed by an outside agency, or planner, in
accordance with his objectives. However, the planner is not able to commit the
parties fully to the outcome of his mechanism - once the outcome is known, it may
be renegotiated by the parties. What is the set of allocations which the planner is
able to achieve in this environment and how can they be achieved?
We address these questions in the context of a model with two players and one-
sided asymmetric information: one player's (the principal's) payo function is com-
mon knowledge, but the other's (the agent's) is private information. A third party
designs a mechanism to govern their relationship. We have in mind situations in
which this designer (the planner) is a regulator or a higher level of authority in the
organization to which the principal belongs. An alternative application is the design
of a trading platform or a market where sellers and buyers who do not know each
other are matched. In each of these cases, the planner may have an objective func-
tion which diers from those of the players, though the arguments of the function
may include the principal's expected payo and/or the distribution of utilities and
decisions across the various types of agent.
The planner puts in place a mechanism in which the agent sends a message to the
principal, determining some contracted decision and money payment. However, the
two players cannot be obliged to stick to this decision. We assume that, at this point,
the principal is able to design a second-stage mechanism to determine the actual deci-
sion and transfer. Her optimal mechanism will depend on what she has learned from
her interaction with the agent in the planner's mechanism. Consequently, we cannot
assume that the agent's message in the planner's mechanism reveals his type be-
cause the principal, knowing the truth, would subsequently extract all the remaining
surplus. This in turn would give the agent an incentive to understate his type.
To determine what the planner can achieve in this setting we characterize the
implementable decision and utility schedules: that is, functions mapping the agent's
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type to, respectively, decision and expected utility, taking renegotiation into account.
As in the commitment case, once the implementable decision schedules have been de-
termined, the implementable expected utility schedules can be derived by integration.
If a decision schedule (mapping types of agent to decisions) is renegotiation-
implementable (i.e., implementable taking into account renegotiation as described
above) then it is easy to see that it must, as in the commitment case, be an increas-
ing function. It must also give the ecient decision to the top type and a weakly
lower-than-ecient decision to all types. We derive (in Proposition 3) two further
conditions which a strictly increasing, dierentiable decision schedule must satisfy if
it is renegotiation-implementable. One puts an upper bound on the slope of the func-
tion, which depends on the prior distribution over types. The second condition is that,
for every type, the decision must be at least as high as it would be if there were no
planner's mechanism and the principal simply oered her prior optimal mechanism.
Moreover, one mechanism which implements a particular implementable schedule
is simply the same truth-telling direct revelation mechanism which would implement
it in the commitment case, although the equilibrium is very dierent. In equilibrium,
rather than tell the truth with probability 1, the agent uses a mixed strategy - a
type  of the agent randomizes over messages below , so that the principal, given
announcement 0, has a posterior belief distributed over types 0 and above. The
principal's equilibrium strategy is to oer the planner's mechanism again after any
message. The agent then selects the decision and transfer which he would have chosen
had the two players been committed to the mechanism in the rst place.
In Proposition 4 we show, by construction, that any decision schedule which satis-
es the necessary conditions can be renegotiation-implemented in this way. In Propo-
sition 5, we show that the equilibrium is unique. In other words, we have the striking
result that, for a large class of decision rules, the standard incentive-compatible mech-
anism has a strong renegotiation-proofness property - after any message, the principal
never wants to oer a new mechanism. The planner does not have to be concerned
about whether renegotiation might be possible - the same mechanism delivers the
desired outcome for every type whether it is possible or not. A further appealing fea-
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ture is that the planner does not need to know the prior distribution over the agent's
types, the principal's prior belief.
These results can be regarded as contributing to the bargaining literature as well
as to the mechanism design literature. Given a xed bargaining game of incomplete
information, one can ask: in what ways is it possible for an uninformed outsider to
alter the outcome of the game by obliging the parties to sign a contract beforehand?
Our framework can also be interpreted from this point of view.
Related Literature
Various notions of renegotiation-proofness for mechanisms have been proposed.
In the incomplete information case, much of the literature concerns interim rene-
gotiation, i.e., the parties have an opportunity to renegotiate before they play the
mechanism. For example, Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) dene a decision rule (or
mechanism) M as durable if, given any type prole, and any alternative mechanism
~M , the players would not vote unanimously to replace M by ~M if a neutral third
party were to propose it to them (see also Crawford (1985), Palfrey and Srivastava
(1991) and Laguno (1995)). Ex post renegotiation has been studied by Green and
Laont (1987), Forges (1994), and Neeman and Pavlov (2013). In these contributions
the concepts employed are variations on the principle that a mechanism is (ex post)
renegotiation-proof if, for any outcome x of the mechanism and any alternative out-
come y, the players would not vote unanimously for y in preference to x if a neutral
third party were to propose it to them. Such denitions of renegotiation-proofness
have the merit that, if a given mechanism satises it, the mechanism is robust against
all possible alternative outcomes. However, it also has the drawback that the implied
renegotiation process does not have a non-cooperative character. Under an alterna-
tive modeling of this process, a renegotiation proposal would be made by one of the
parties to the mechanism.
In this paper we use the latter notion of renegotiation. This is closer to the
one generally used for the complete information case (Maskin and Moore (1999), Se-
gal and Whinston (2002)), in which, for any inecient outcome of the mechanism,
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there is a single renegotiation outcome, which can be predicted by the players. It
also corresponds to the approach used in the literature on contract renegotiation
(e.g. Dewatripont and Maskin (1990), Hart and Tirole (1988), Laont and Tirole
(1988,1990)) in which a trading opportunity is repeated a number of times and the
focus is on comparing the outcomes of long-term contracts, sequences of short-term
contracts, and long-term contracts which can be renegotiated (i.e., in the two-period
case, the parties are committed for one period, but in the second period there is an
opportunity to change the contract). The contract renegotiation literature is con-
cerned with analyzing the optimal mechanism from the point of view of the principal
(one of the two parties to the contract). The same applies to Skreta (2006), who
considers a buyer-seller model similar in some ways to ours, but with T periods and
discounting, and shows that it is optimal for the principal to oer a price in each
period. Our paper is dierent in that we are concerned with characterizing the set
of outcome functions which could in principle be implemented by a third party, the
planner, whose objectives dier from those of the insiders.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on incomplete information bargaining
beginning with Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Firstly, one interpretation of a mecha-
nism is that it is a device for understanding what can be achieved by non-cooperative
bargaining games and secondly, as noted above, our analysis can be understood as a
characterization of what can be achieved by imposing a contract on two bargainers
before they begin an exogenous non-cooperative bargaining game.
Another strand of literature to which the paper is related is recent work in organi-
zational theory, stemming from Crawford and Sobel (1982). In Krishna and Morgan
(2008), the uninformed decision maker can commit to a contract which pays the in-
formed sender a monetary transfer which depends on the message sent, but cannot
commit to the action which she then takes. In our setting the sender is the buyer
and the decision maker is the seller, who can only partially commit to her action
(the renegotiation price oer). See also Ottaviani (2000) for a model with informed
senders, monetary transfers and lack of commitment by the receiver.
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Outline
Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 contains the analysis and results. Subsec-
tion 3.1 proves a modied revelation principle which is helpful in deriving the neces-
sary conditions. It shows that without loss of generality we can consider equilibria
of the form which we construct later. Subsection 3.2 derives necessary conditions
for implementation. In Subsection 3.3 we construct an equilibrium for an arbitrary
decision schedule which satises the necessary conditions and proves the strong im-
plementation (uniqueness) result. Section 4 concludes. Some of the proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
A principal (P ) and an agent (A) must choose a decision x from the set X =
[x; x]  <+, and a money transfer t. The agent has a privately known type  which
follows a distribution F , with dierentiable density f > 0, on the interval  = [; ],
where  > 0. Both players are expected utility maximizers and have quasi-linear
utility for money. If the decision is x 2 X and A transfers t to P , then P 's payo is
V (x; t) = t   cx, where c > 0, and A's payo is U(x; t; ) = u(x; )   t, where u is
a thrice-dierentiable function satisfying the conditions ux > 0; uxx < 0; ux > 0 and
uxx > 0, with subscripts denoting derivatives. We make the following assumption
about u.
Assumption 1 ux(x; ) < c < ux(x; ).
We denote by () the set of distribution functions on . The reservation utility
for P and for each type of A is zero.
A third party (the planner) chooses a mechanism to govern the choice of decision
and transfer. A mechanism  is a triple (M;x; t) consisting of a set of messages
M , where M is a metric space, and (abusing notation slightly) a pair of functions
x : M ! X and t : M ! <. A chooses a message m 2M . When message m is sent,
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x(m) is the contracted decision and t(m) is the contracted payment to be paid by
A to P . We assume throughout that communication is direct (there is no mediator)
and that mechanisms are non-stochastic. Denote the set of possible mechanisms by
 .
The planner, however, is not fully able to commit the parties to the mechanism.
Although A and P are obliged to play the planner's mechanism if they want to
interact, after the play of the mechanism they have the option of choosing a further
mechanism to play in order to arrive at an outcome which they both prefer. We
assume that at this renegotiation stage all of the bargaining power lies with the
principal, the uninformed party3. In other words, once the outcome of the planner's
mechanism, (~x; ~t), is known, the principal chooses a mechanism to oer to the agent.
A can either play this new mechanism or obtain the outcome (~x; ~t). Clearly P 's
optimal mechanism at the renegotiation stage will depend on her updated belief
about A which the play of the planner's mechanism has generated.
Discussion
If the planner cared only about maximizing the expected payo of the principal
then he could simply choose a null mechanism (no decision and no payment). At the
second stage P would then select a mechanism which is optimal for herself, hence for
the planner. More generally, however, the planner, in designing the mechanism, cares
about the distribution of utilities and/or decisions across the dierent types of agent,
rather than solely the principal's expected payo.
For example, consider a case in which A is a buyer, P is a division of a rm,
the planner is the headquarters of the rm and the decision x is the quantity of
production of a good to be sold to A. The division aims to maximize its own prots;
the headquarters, however, is interested both in the prot which the division makes
from a particular buyer but also in the prots to be made from this buyer by its
other divisions in the future. This prot may depend both on the type of the buyer
and, because, say, of learning eects, on the quantity consumed by the buyer, which
3If the agent had the bargaining power results analogous to ours would trivially hold.
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aects future willingness-to-pay. The planner, in order to further its wider objectives,
chooses a mechanism (price schedule) for all its retailers to employ. When a customer
arrives at a shop and places an order which is not optimal from the salesperson's
perspective, i.e. not prot-maximizing given her updated beliefs, the salesperson
may have an incentive to oer to sell more at a discounted price.
For another example, the planner may be a government which is regulating the
rm (P ). The government's objective function is increasing in the rm's prot but it is
also interested in the distribution of consumers' utilities, perhaps because willingness-
to-pay for the good in question is related to income.
An alternative formulation is that the mechanism designer is the principal, who
is interested only in her own expected prot, but expected prot is a function of the
distribution of utilities across agent types. For example, as in the hold-up literature,
there may be a prior investment stage. Suppose, for example, that the agent rst
chooses a level of costly unveriable investment and that higher investment will lead,
on average, to a higher marginal utility of x for the agent. P chooses a mechanism
which determines a utility schedule (mapping agent type to utility). This determines
the agent's prior investment which in turn determines the distribution of types and
hence P 's expected prot.
In all of the above cases, the rst step is to characterize the set of utility schedules
which can be implemented by some mechanism. This implementation problem, for
the case in which the planner cannot prevent the parties from renegotiating the mech-
anism ex post, is the subject of this paper. The main complication, of course, arises
from the fact that the agent, anticipating the renegotiation, will alter his behavior
when he plays the planner's mechanism.
Our formulation assumes that the principal is able to commit to her second-stage
mechanism. One possible reason for this is that from the point at which P and Ameet
there is, for exogenous reasons such as perishability, a nite time available in which
to complete the transaction. The planner, on the other hand, is not able to exploit
this deadline because he cannot observe the precise times at which principals and
agents meet, or their horizons. More generally, there are many settings in which it is
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harder for a third party to commit other agents than it is for those agents to commit
themselves. We conjecture that our results would generalize to other extensive forms,
such as bargaining games in which both players discount the future and the principal
makes oers at each discrete period over an innite horizon. We include some remarks
on this in subsection 3.5 below.
We assume above that the principal and agent have to choose between taking their
zero-utility outside option and, at least initially, using the planner's mechanism. This
is appropriate to the examples described above and also to many others: for example,
the case in which the planner is a market designer who constructs an environment
in which buyers and sellers meet and interact. Our assumption that the principal,
at the second stage, can choose any mechanism that the planner could have chosen
seems strong, but, as will become clear, our results will apply as long as the set of
mechanisms from which the principal can choose includes the mechanism which the
planner has given them - i.e., it is always an option for the principal to oer the same
mechanism again.
Strategies and Equilibrium
A planner's mechanism (M;x; t) and the post-mechanism stage together dene a
game of incomplete information. Call this game (M;x; t).
Given an outcome (~x; ~t) of the planner's mechanism, and a mechanism  2  
oered by P , A chooses either the default outcome (~x; ~t) or plays the mechanism .
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium A will choose optimally given his type, i.e., will
either play the mechanism optimally or, if the default gives a higher payo, choose
the latter.
Given her belief G 2 () over A's types, P will, at the preceding stage, choose
a mechanism to oer to A which is optimal for P .
Let DIC(~x; ~t) be the set of incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanisms
which dominate the default outcome (~x; ~t) for all types, i.e., mechanisms (; x; t)
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such that, for all ; 0 2 ,
u(x(); )  t()  u(x(0); )  t(0)
and
u(x(); )  t()  u(~x; )  ~t:
By the revelation principle, we can assume without loss of generality that P
chooses a mechanism in DIC(~x; ~t) and that, for all  2 , type  of A accepts the
mechanism and tells the truth.
Given the above, we can take a pure strategy for P in (M;x; t) to be a function
sP : M !   such that, for m 2 M , sP (m) 2 DIC(x(m); t(m)). We only consider
equilibria in which P 's strategy is pure. Denote by SP the set of P 's pure strategies.
Similarly, we can take a pure strategy for A in (M;x; t) to be a function which
maps  to M . We take a mixed strategy for A to specify a mixed strategy for each
type of A where a mixed strategy4 for type  of A is a distribution function sA(:j)
on M . Let the set of these strategies be denoted by SA.
If P 's strategy is sP 2 SP and A is type  2  and sends m 2 M , let the post-
renegotiation decision and transfer be denoted by (x(m; sP ; ); t(m; sP ; )); that is,
the mechanism sP (m) gives this outcome. Then the expected payo of type  if he
sends message m is U(m; sP ; ) = u(x(m; sP ; ); )  t(m; sP ; ).
For (~x; ~t) 2 X  < and G 2 (), let P ((~x; ~t); G)  DIC(~x; ~t) be the set of
solutions to the problem
max(;x;t)2DIC(~x;~t)
Z 

t()  cx()dG();
in which x(:) is a right-continuous function5.
4It is possible to dene a continuum of mixed strategies over M via a distributional strategy
as in Milgrom and Weber (1985), i.e., a joint distribution on M   for which the marginal on 
corresponds to the prior F . sA(:j) is then the distribution onM conditional on . See also Crawford
and Sobel (1982).
5For any solution in which x(:) is not right-continuous, there is a payo-equivalent one in which
it is.
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Denition 1: A renegotiation equilibrium (or r-equilibrium) of (M;x; t) is a pro-
le of strategies (sP ; sA) 2 SP  SA, and, for each m 2 M , a belief G(:jm) 2 ()
such that
(i) for each  2  sA() puts probability 1 on messages which maximize U(m; sP ; );
(ii) for each m 2M , sP (m) 2 P ((x(m); t(m)); G(:jm));
and
(iii) for each m 2 M , G(:jm) is the conditional distribution over  given F and
sA.
If the strategy prole is (sA; sP ) then the expected payo of type  of A is
U(sA; sP ; ) =
R
m
U(m; sP ; )dsA(mj). Let the random variable x(sA; sP ; ) be the
nal decision if the strategy prole is (sA; sP ).
Denition 2: (i) A function U :  ! <+ is a r-implementable utility schedule
if there exists a mechanism (M;x; t) 2   such that (M;x; t) has a renegotiation
equilibrium (sA; sP ; fG(:jm)gm2M) for which, for all  2 , U() = U(sA; sP ; ).
(ii) A function U :  ! <+ is strongly r-implementable if there exists a mecha-
nism (M;x; t) such that, for all  2 , U() = U(sA; sP ; ) for every renegotiation
equilibrium (sA; sB; fG(:jm)gm2M) of (M;x; t).
Denition 3: A function x : ! X is a r-implementable decision schedule if there
exists a mechanism (M; x^; t) and a renegotiation equilibrium (sA; sP ; fG(:jm)gm2M)
of (M; x^; t) such that, for all  2 , x() = x^(sA; sP ; ) with probability 1.
The fact that U must be non-negative reects the fact that A's outside utility
has been normalized to zero and we allow him not to participate in the mechanism.
We refer to a utility schedule or decision schedule as c-implementable if it can be
implemented in the case in which the players can be committed to the mechanism.
By standard results (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1993), Milgrom and Segal (2002)) x is
c-implementable if and only if x() is non-decreasing, and U  0 is c-implementable if
and only if, for all  2 , U() U() = R 

u(x(~); ~)d~ for some non-decreasing func-
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tion x : ! X. A c-implementable U is absolutely continuous and a.e. dierentiable.
It is easy to show, using revelation principle arguments, that r-implementability and
c-implementability are related as follows.
Proposition 1 If U (resp. x) is r-implementable then U (resp. x) is c-implementable.
The rst-best decision for  solves the problem
maxx2Xu(x; )  cx:
By our assumptions this has a unique solution which we denote by x(). Further-
more, x(:) is strictly increasing in .
3 Analysis
3.1 A Revelation Principle
It is easy to show that the ecient decision schedule x(:) is r-implementable.
Take an incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism which implements it in the
commitment case. There is an equilibrium in which each type tells the truth in this
mechanism and, after any message , leading to default (x(); t()), the principal
oers the default again, as a xed outcome. This is an optimal oer because A's
type is common knowledge and so the default is known to be ecient. Equally, as we
noted in the Discussion above, it is easy to implement P 's ex ante optimal mechanism
(i.e., given belief F ), which we denote by (xF (:); tF (:)), using a null mechanism. The
questions we ask are: what other schedules are r-implementable, and how can they
be implemented?
Consider P 's optimal decision given belief G 2 () and default outcome (~x; ~t).
Denote the minimum and maximum of supp(G) by (G) and (G) respectively. If an
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incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism fx(); t()g2 satises
u(x((G)); (G))  t((G))  u(~x; (G))  ~t
then, for all  > (G),
u(x(); )  t()  u(~x; )  ~t:
It follows that choosing P 's optimal (; x; t) 2 DIC(~x; ~t) is payo-equivalent to
choosing P 's optimal incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism for type space
supp(G) subject to the constraint that the payo of type (G) is at least u(~x; (G)) ~t.
Therefore, by standard results, an optimal mechanism fx(); t()g2 satises
x((G)) = x((G));
x() < x() 8 2 supp(G)=;
and
u(x((G)); (G))  t((G)) = u(~x; (G))  ~t:
Furthermore, the downward incentive constraints bind. Therefore, if  2 supp(G)
and 0 2 supp(G) for 0 >  but (; 0)  (supp(G))C then u(x(0); 0)   t(0) =
u(x(); 0)  t().
The Lemma below establishes that, in any r-equilibrium of any mechanism, the
nal (post-renegotiation) decisions satisfy the usual monotonicity property (message
by message) and are less than or equal to the ecient decisions. It also establishes,
using these two properties, that decisions are deterministic - although a given type of
A may randomize over messages, each message in the support of his strategy will lead
to the same nal decision (and transfer). This Lemma, and all subsequent Lemmas
and Propositions, are to be understood as referring to almost all .
Lemma 1 Suppose that (sA; sP ; fG(:jm)gm2M) is a r-equilibrium of (M;x; t),
where (M;x; t) 2  .
(i) Take any  and 0 > . If m 2 supp(sA(:j)) and m0 2 supp(sA(:j0)) then
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x(m; sP ; )  x(m0; sP ; 0);
(ii) x(sA; sP ; )  x() w.pr.1;
(iii) Suppose m and m0 are both in supp(sA(:j)). Then x(m; sP ; ) = x(m0; sP ; )
and t(m; sP ; ) = t(m
0; sP ; ).
Fix a mechanism (M; ~x; ~t) and a r-equilibrium (~sA; ~sP ; f ~G(:jm)gm2M) of (M; ~x; ~t).
Lemma 1 implies that for each  this equilibrium has a deterministic nal outcome
(x(~sA; ~sP ; ); t(~sA; ~sP ; )). Abusing notation slightly, denote this outcome function
by f(x(); t())g2. This is an incentive-compatible schedule, otherwise some type
could protably deviate by imitating another type over the two-stage game. So, for
any m, P 's proposed mechanism coincides with f(x(); t())g2supp( ~G(:jm)) for types in
supp( ~G(:jm)).
The next proposition gives a modied revelation principle. It shows that the same
outcome as is achieved in the given equilibrium (namely (fx(); t()g2)) can also
be achieved by giving the parties the direct revelation mechanism (; x; t). It is clear
that in the equilibrium of (; x; t) which achieves this the agent will not tell the
truth, as he would in the commitment case. Instead, he randomizes over messages
below his true type and, whatever message he sends, the principal will always oer
the planner's mechanism again.
Proposition 2 For any r-implementable outcome function (x(:); t(:)) it is possible
to implement it by means of the direct revelation mechanism (; x; t) and an equilib-
rium in which, for each type  of A the support of the mixed strategy is a subset of
[; ], and, after any message, P oers the same mechanism, (; x; t).
Proof As above, let (~sA; ~sP ; f ~G(:jm)gm2M) be an r-equilibrium of (M; ~x; ~t)
which r-implements the given outcome function (x; t). It is convenient to construct
the argument in two steps: rst dene a mechanism ( ~M; x^; t^) which r-implements
(x; t) and then construct the required direct revelation mechanism.
Let ~M =
S
 supp(~sA(:j)). Dene mechanism ( ~M; x^; t^) by x^(m) = x(( ~G(:jm)))
and t^(m) = t(( ~G(:jm))). That is, the new mechanism, for message m, gives as
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default the nal outcome in the original mechanism and equilibrium for the lowest
type which sends that message. Then (~sA; sP ; ~G(:jm)m2 ~M) is an r-equilibrium of
( ~M; x^; t^), where, for all m 2 ~M , sP (m) is the direct revelation mechanism (; x; t).
To see this, note rst that, since A's strategy is the same as in the rst equilibrium,
(~sA; ~sP ) and so are P 's beliefs, the beliefs satisfy Bayesian updating. For any message,
the oered menu is the same, and all possible defaults belong to this menu, so any
type of A is indierent between all messages. Therefore A's strategy is optimal. To
see that P 's strategy is optimal, consider a message m 2 ~M . In the rst equilibrium,
P chooses an optimal incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism (IC-DRM)
subject to the constraint that the lowest type, (G(:jm)), gets at least
u(~x(m); ( ~G(:jm)))  ~t(m):
In the new game, P chooses an optimal IC-DRM such that the lowest type gets at
least
u(x(( ~G(:jm))); ( ~G(:jm)))  t(( ~G(:jm))):
Since, in the rst problem, the lowest type gets zero rent, these two expressions are
equal. Also, the beliefs are the same, so the two problems have the same set of
solutions. For types outside supp( ~G(:jm) the oered schedule is arbitrary, as long as
overall incentive-compatibility is satised. Therefore P 's strategy is optimal.
Now suppose, for the second step, that the rst-stage mechanism is (; x; t). There
is an equilibrium of (; x; t) in which, for any message 0 2 , sP (0) = (; x; t).
That is, after any message, P oers the same mechanism again, and so the decision
schedule is x, as in the given equilibrium of (M; ~x; ~t). A's strategy sA in this
equilibrium is given by
A(Bj) = ~A(fm 2 ~M j( ~G(:jm)) 2 Bgj);
for all  2  and B  , where A(:j) is the measure over  corresponding to sA
and ~(:j) corresponds similarly to ~sA. In eect, type  of A randomizes over ~M
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according to ~sA(:j) and then, given m, reports ( ~G(:jm)), the lowest type who would
send m, according to ~sA. To see that this is an equilibrium, observe rst that A's
strategy is optimal because he is indierent between all messages. To see that P 's
strategy is optimal, take  2 supp(sA). Let m() = fm 2 ~M j( ~G(:jm)) = g. For any
m 2 m(), we know that P nds it optimal to oer (; x; t) given default (x(); t())
when A's strategy is ~sA and A has sent message m. Hence, given default (x(); t())
and announcement  (which is equivalent to the knowledge that m = m()), P still
nds (; x; t) optimal.
Note that for any m 2 supp(~sA(:j)), ( ~G(:jm))  , so in this equilibrium type 
only randomizes over types weakly below his true type. QED.
3.2 Necessary Conditions for r-implementability
Proposition 2 enables us to establish conditions which r-implementable decision
(and hence utility) schedules must satisfy, since the form of the equilibrium described
in the Proposition restricts the possible second-stage beliefs.
Together with Lemma 1, Proposition 2 implies that if (x; t) is r-implementable
then x() = x() and x()  x() for all  2 . Furthermore, since (x; t) must
be incentive-compatible x must be non-decreasing. We restrict attention to decision
schedules x(:) which are strictly increasing, dierentiable and satisfy x() < x() for
all  < . The next Lemma shows that, for such schedules, any message  which is
sent in the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is sent by all types above the lowest
type which sends  - after any message, the support of P 's belief is of the form [0; ].
Lemma 2 Suppose (x; t) is r-implementable and x is strictly increasing and sat-
ises x() < x() for all  < . Then (x; t) is r-implemented by an equilibrium
(sA; sP ; fG(:j)g2) of (; x; t) in which, for all  2 supp(sA), supp(G(:j)) =
[(G(:j); ] and, if 0 2 supp(sA(1)) then 0 2 supp(sA(2)) for all 2 > 1.
Proof In the equilibrium described in Proposition 2, after message , P will opti-
mally oer a mechanism which gives the ecient outcome for (G) = max(supp(G(:j))),
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by eciency at the top. If (G(:j))) <  this implies that she doesn't oer (; x; t).
Contradiction. Therefore (G(:j))) =  for any message  in the support of A's
strategy.
Suppose that 1 2 supp(G(:j)), 2 2 supp(G(:j)), where 2 > 1 but (1; 2) \
supp(G(:j)) = ;. Then, since downward incentive constraints bind in sP (), type 2
is indierent between (x(1); t(1)) and (x(2); t(2)). But this contradicts the fact
that (x; t) is IC for the type set  and x is strictly increasing. Hence, the support of
P 's posterior belief is an interval. QED
Consider a schedule (x; t) which satises the assumptions of Lemma 2, and such
that x is dierentiable. (; x; t) r-implements this outcome by means of an equilib-
rium (sA; sP ; fG(:j)g2), as in Proposition 2. Since no type puts positive probability
on messages above their true type,  must put probability 1 on , i.e., tell the truth,
so  is in the support of A's strategy sA. Denote G(:j) by Gx. Then Lemma 2 im-
plies that supp(Gx) = . Furthermore, (x; t) is optimal for P given belief Gx, so (see
Myerson (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)) x must point-wise maximize virtual
surplus
u(x(); )  1 Gx()
gx()
u(x(); )  cx;
where gx is the density of Gx (it can be shown, using a sequence of approximating
models with nitely many types, that Gx has a density, and so that, if Gx has an
atom, it must be at ). Therefore, for all  > ,
1 Gx()
gx()
=
(ux(x(); )  c)
ux(x(); )
: (1)
Since x(:) is dierentiable, this implies that gx is dierentiable.
Furthermore, take any other message 1 in the support of A's strategy. Let the
support of P 's belief G(:j1) be [1; ]. Then it is again optimal for P to oer (; x; t),
so G(:j1) must be the same as Gx, scaled to the support [1; ], i.e., for 0 2 [1; ],
G(0j1) = Gx(
0) Gx(1)
1 Gx(1)
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and
1 G(0j1)
g(0j1) =
1 Gx(0)
gx(0)
:
This, together with the fact that each type only sends messages below his true
type, implies that the hazard rate of Gx is everywhere greater than that of the prior
F and that the proportional growth rate of gx is everywhere less than that of f .
Essentially, all types must randomize in a proportionally similar way, in order for P
to want to oer the same mechanism no matter what message she receives. However,
lower types randomize over a smaller set of messages, so any message 0 is more likely
to have been sent by lower types in [0; ] than by higher ones.
Lemma 3 Let Gx and gx be dened as above. For all  2 , (i)
1 Gx()
gx(
 1  F ()
f()
and (ii)
g0x()
gx()
 f
0()
f()
:
The next proposition gives necessary conditions for x() to be r-implementable.
Recall that xF is P 's optimal decision schedule given belief F .
Proposition 3 Suppose that (x(:); t(:)) is r-implementable and x is strictly in-
creasing and dierentiable and satises x() < x() for all  < . Then (i)
f 0()
f()
+ A(x(); ) + x0()B(x(); )  0 (2)
for all  2 , where
A(x; ) =
2ux(x; )
(ux(x; )  c)  
ux(x; )
ux(x; )
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and
B(x; ) =
uxx(x; )
(ux(x; )  c)  
uxx(x; )
ux(x; )
;
and (ii) x()  xF () for all .
Proof (i) By Lemma 3(ii),
f 0()
f()
  g
0
x()
gx()
 0:
Since
g0x()
gx()
=   gx()
1 Gx()  
d
d
(1 Gx()
gx()
)
1 Gx()
gx()
(3)
it follows, using (1), that
g0x()
gx()
=  A(x(); )  x0()B(x(); ):
(ii) follows from Lemma 3(i), (1), the corresponding equation for F and the fact that
ux(x; )  c
ux(x; )
is decreasing in x if x < x(). QED
The necessary condition in Proposition 3(i) places an upper bound on the slope
of x, the bound depending locally on the prior and on the level of x. For some priors,
this upper bound is negative at certain points; in that case an increasing x cannot be
implemented and so x would have to have a at section there. Consider the case in
which u(x; ) = u(x). Then the condition becomes
x0()   u
0(x())(u0(x())  c)
cu00(x())
[
f 0()
f()
+
2u0(x())
(u0(x())  c) ]:
u0 > 0; u00 < 0 and, since x() is strictly below the ecient level, u0(x())   c > 0.
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Therefore the right hand side must be negative if
f 0()
f()
+
2u0(x())
(u0(x())  c) < 0;
so the necessary condition is harder to satisfy if f is falling fast.
In the linear case6, in which u(x; ) = x and the set of decisions X = [0; 1], then
B(x(); ) = 0 and A(x(); ) = 2( c) 1. Therefore the necessary condition becomes
f 0() + 2f()  0. Since this is independent of x0(), any increasing function which
is above xF can be implemented as long as the condition is satised. The condition
is equivalent to concavity of the revenue function R() = (1  F ()), which in turn
is implied by the increasing hazard rate assumption on F .
3.3 Sucient Conditions for r-implementability
Suppose that an incentive-compatible schedule (x; t) satises the conditions of
Proposition 3. Is it possible to r-implement it? In this subsection we show that it is.
We construct an equilibrium of the type described in Proposition 2. The planner's
mechanism is (; x; t). Each type  has a mixed strategy with support [; ] and a
mass point on . After any announcement, P oers (; x; t) again.
Let z() = A(x(); )+x0()B(x(); ). The mixed strategy of type  of A, sA(:j),
is given by
sA(
0j) = f(
0)
f()
exp[ 
Z 
0
z(u)du]
for 0   and sA(0j) = 1 for 0 > . By (2)  z() is bounded, so this integral is
well-dened. The density is then
A(
0j) = 1
f()
[exp( 
Z 
0
z(u)du)][f 0(0) + f(0)z(0)]:
This distribution is well-dened because f 0(0) + f(0)z(0) > 0 by (2).
6We discuss the linear case in subsection 3.4 below.
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Given message  2 , P 's belief is
G(0j) =
R 0

exp[  R u

z(w)dw]duR 

exp[  R u

z(w)dw]du
for 0   and G(0j) = 0 for 0 < .
By Bayes' rule, the conditional density of type 0   after message  is
f(0)A(j0)R 

f(u)A(ju)du
=
exp[  R 0

z(w)dw]R 

exp[  R u

z(w)dw]du
so P 's beliefs are correct given A's strategy. A's strategy is optimal because every
message leads to the same oered schedule (x; t), so he is indierent between all
messages. It remains to show that P 's optimal mechanism is (; x; t) after every
message, i.e., that
1 G(0j)
g(0j) =
(ux(x(
0); 0)  c)
ux(x(0); 0)
for every message  2  and 0  .
Let k(v) =
R v

z(w)dw for v  . Then
1 G(0j)
g(0j) =
R 
0 exp[ k(v)]dv
exp[ k(0)]
so we need to show thatZ 
0
exp[ k(v)]dv = exp[ k(0)](ux(x(
0); 0)  c)
ux(x(0); 0)
: (4)
For 0 = , the LHS of (4) is zero, and the RHS is also zero since ux(x(); )  c = 0
by eciency at the top. The derivative of the LHS with respect to 0 is  exp[ k(0)].
The derivative of the RHS is
(ux   c)
ux
e k(
0)( k0(0)) + e k(0)ux[uxxx
0(0) + ux]  (ux   c)[ux + uxxx0(0)]
(ux)2
where arguments (x(0); 0) have been omitted for brevity. Since k0(0) = z(0), this
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is equal to  exp[ k(0)] and so (4) is true for all 0. This shows that P 's strategy is
optimal. Therefore we have:
Proposition 4 Any incentive-compatible schedule (x; t) such that x is strictly
increasing and dierentiable, satises xF ()  x() < x() for  < , x() = x()
and condition (2) is r-implementable.
Proposition 4 establishes that any schedule (x; t) which satises the necessary
conditions can be implemented by simply giving the parties the incentive-compatible
DRM which implements the schedule in the case when they can be committed to the
mechanism. The next Proposition shows that, in the game dened by this mechanism,
the equilibrium described above is essentially unique - in any equilibrium of the game,
the outcome is (x; t).
Proposition 5 Suppose given an incentive-compatible schedule (x; t) such that x
is strictly increasing and dierentiable and satises xF ()  x() < x() for  < ,
x() = x() and condition (2). Then the game (; x; t) has a unique equilibrium
outcome.
Proof Let U() be the payo schedule of the equilibrium described above.
By standard results,
U() = U() +
Z 

u~(x(
~); ~)d~ (5)
Therefore, if every equilibrium of (; x; t) has the same utility schedule then it
gives the same outcome, namely (x(); t()), to each type , since ux > 0. Suppose
then that there is an equilibrium with utility schedule ~U 6= U . Call this equilibrium
(~sA; ~sP ; ~G). Since any type  is able to tell the truth in (; x; t) and decline to
renegotiate, giving u(x(); )   t() = U(), it must be that ~U()  U() for all
 2 .
Given 0 2 supp(~sA), let 00 = min[supp( ~G(:j0)]. Suppose that 00 6= 0. Since
the lowest type in the support gets zero surplus, the equilibrium payo of type 00 is
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the default payo u(x(0); 00)   t(0) < u(x(00); 00)   t(00) = U(00). Contradiction.
Therefore the lowest type which sends message 0 is 0, and the equilibrium payo
~U(0) = U(0). This implies that no type sends messages above their true type.
By Lemma 1(iii), we can assume without loss of generality that in the strategy
prole (~sA; ~sP ) P oers (; ~x; ~t) after any message.
Let 1 = inf(j ~U() > U()) and let 2 = inf(j > 1; ~U() = U()) unless
~U() > U() for all  > 1, in which case let 2 = .
(a) Assume that 2 < .
Then ~U() > U() for all  2 (1; 2), ~U(1) = U(1) and ~U(2) = U(2), by
continuity of ~U and U . Since min(supp( ~G(j))) =  it follows that  =2 supp(~sA) if
 2 (1; 2), otherwise  would be the lowest type to send message , hence ~U() =
U(). So no type in (1; 2) sends any message in (1; 2).
Since P oers (; ~x; ~t) after any message, (~x; ~t) is optimal for P conditional on
the set of messages [; 1]. Let P 's probability distribution conditional on this set
be denoted by ~G1 with density ~g1. Then, for  2 (1; 2), ~g1() = f() since types
in (1; 2) only send messages in [; 1]. Hence, by the argument in the proof of
Proposition 3,
f 0()
f()
=  A(~x(); )  ~x0()B(~x(); )
for  2 (1; 2), which also implies that ~x is dierentiable on (1; 2).
By Lemma 3,
g0x()
gx()
 f
0()
f()
:
So
 A(~x(); )  ~x0()B(~x(); )   A(x(); )  x0()B(x(); )
for  2 (1; 2). Hence, if ~x() = x(); ~x0()  x0(). For small enough " > 0,
~U() > U() for  2 (1; 1 + "). Therefore ~x() > x() for  2 (1; 1 + ") by (5).
Therefore, since ~x0  x0 whenever ~x = x,
Z 2
1
u(~x(); )d >
Z 2
1
u(x(); )d
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which contradicts ~U(2) > U(2).
(b) Now assume that 2 = , so that ~U() > U() for all  2 (1; ].
According to the equilibrium strategy ~sA, types in (1; ] only send messages in
[; 1], so, conditional on this set of messages, P 's belief ~G1 satises
1  ~G1()
g1()
=
1  F ()
f()
for  > 1. Also (~x; ~t) is optimal for P given this belief so
1  F ()
f()
=
ux(~x(); )  c
ux(~x(); )
:
From Lemma 3
1  F ()
f()
 1 Gx()
gx()
=
ux(x(); )  c
ux(x(); )
so x()  ~x() for  2 (1; ) since ux > 0. By (5) this contradicts the fact that
~U() > U() on this interval. QED
3.4 The Linear Case
One leading case, treated in the previous version of this paper, is the bilateral trade
model, in which the principal is a seller of a unit quantity of a divisible good and the
agent is a buyer, type  of whom has utility x for quantity x. So X = [0; 1] and
u(x; ) = x. xF is a step function corresponding to a posted price mechanism, equal
to zero below some ^ and equal to 1 above ^. The ecient quantity is 1 (assuming
c < 1), hence not strictly increasing as in our model above.
Our results above apply also to this case. The density of the mixed strategy dened
in the argument leading to Proposition 4 becomes in this case (f(0)(0)2)(f()2) 1
for types  below a critical value , and higher types have the same strategy as type
24
. It is straightforward to show that the principal's updated belief Gx is such that7
1 Gx()
gx()
=    c;
and so virtual utility is zero for all types. Therefore P is indierent between all mech-
anisms and it is optimal for her to oer the planner's mechanism again. Although,
for generic beliefs, only posted price mechanisms are optimal for P , the beliefs which
arise endogenously in equilibrium are the non-generic ones which justify the given
mechanism.
3.5 No Commitment by the Principal
In the model above we have assumed that the principal, at the second stage, is
able to make a take-it-or-leave-it oer of a mechanism to the agent. We conjecture
that our results will generalize in some form to other extensive forms, including those
in which the principal has much less, or no, commitment power.
One such extensive form, in the linear case of subsection 3.4, would be one in
which there is an innite horizon, discrete time, and at each period, if trade has not
concluded, P oers a posted price for the whole amount of good available. Suppose
that in period 1 A plays the planner's mechanism and, if some of the good remains
unsold, P then oers a price, which A either accepts or rejects. In subsequent periods
2,3,... P similarly makes an oer, and A responds. The parties both discount the
future. To each possible belief which P might have after the play of the planner's
mechanism, we can associate an equilibrium of the bargaining game, and hence a
schedule of discounted expected utilities for the various types of buyer. Suppose that
the planner wants to implement one of these schedules. Our conjecture is that, as in
the model above, it is possible to do so in many cases by giving the parties the direct
revelation mechanism which corresponds to that schedule. This is left for future work.
7For   : for higher types the game is over, since the planner's mechanism has to give quantity
1 to them.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of non-cooperative ex-post renegotiation
on the set of implementable outcomes in a general mechanism design problem. When
full commitment is possible, any increasing decision rule can be implemented by
using a direct revelation mechanism that is designed to elicit the truth from privately
informed parties. When commitment is not possible, the set of implementable rules is
restricted because a direct revelation mechanism cannot fully extract all information
from the parties. Nevertheless, we have shown that the restriction takes a very simple
form - essentially, no type's decision can be reduced by the mechanism, and the
slope of the decision function cannot be too high. Furthermore, the direct revelation
mechanism which is appropriate for the commitment case implements the desired
outcome in the non-commitment case too.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) Since m is optimal for  and m0 is optimal for 0,
u(x(m; sP ; ); )  t(m; sP ; ))  u(x(m0; sP ; 0); )  t(m0; sP ; 0)
and
u(x(m0; sP ; 0); 0)  t(m0; sP ; 0)  u(x(m; sP ; ); 0)  t(m; sP ; ):
Therefore, by supermodularity, x(m0; sP ; 0)  x(m; sP ; ).
(ii) LetM 0() = fm 2M jx(m; sP ; ) > x()g: Ifm 2M 0() then  =2 supp(G(:jm)).
But
pr(f(;m) 2 M j =2 supp (G(:jm))andm 2 supp (sA(:j))g = 0:
Therefore prf 2 jsA(M 0()) > 0g = 0.
(iii) Suppose x(m; sP ; ) > x(m
0; sP ; ). Then Lemma 1(ii) implies that x(m0; sP ; ) <
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x(), and so  < (G(:jm0)). There are two cases to consider. (a) there exists 1 =
minf~ > j~ 2 supp(G(:jm0)g. (b) there exists a sequence fig1i=1  supp(G(:jm0))
and fig1i=1 # .
Case (a): downward incentive constraints bind for the mechanism sP (m
0) so
u(x(m0; sP ; 1); 1)  t(m0; sP ; 1) = u(x(m0; sP ; ); 1)  t(m0; sP ; ) (6)
But  is indierent between m and m0, so
u(x(m0; sP ; ); )  t(m0; sP ; ) = u(x(m; sP ; ); )  t(m; sP ; ):
Therefore, since 1 >  and x(m; sP ; ) > x(m
0; sP ; ),
u(x(m; sP ; ); 1)  t(m; sP ; ) > u(x(m0; sP ; ); 1)  t(m0; sP ; ):
So, by (6),
u(x(m; sP ; ); 1)  t(m; sP ; ) > u(x(m0; sP ; 1); 1)  t(m0; sP ; 1)
which contradicts optimality of message m0 for 1.
Case (b). By Lemma 1(i), x(m; sP ; )  x(m0; sP ; i) for all i 2 fig1i=1: Right-
continuity of sP (m
0) implies x(m0; sP ; )  x(m; sP ; ). Contradiction. QED
Proof of Lemma 3 Since Gx has an atom only at , the same must be true of
sA(:j), which we can take to have a density on (; ]. Denote this density by A(:j).
Take any 1 in the support of sA and any 2 > 1. By Bayes' Rule,
[
1 G(2j1)
g(2j1) ] = [
1  F (2)
f(2)
]
R 
2
A(1j)h()d
A(1j2) ;
where
h() =
f()
1  F (2) :
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Hence
A(1j2)(1 Gx(2)
gx(2)
) = (
1  F (2)
f(2)
)
Z 
2
A(1j)h()d:
If 1 = , the same applies, with sA replacing A, i.e. probability mass rather than
density. Integrating over 1 2 [; 2],
(
1 Gx(2)
gx(2)
)[sA(j2) +
Z 2

A(j2)d]
= (
1  F (2)
f(2)
)[
Z 
2
sA(j)h()d +
Z 2

Z 
2
A(1j)h()dd1]:
But
sA(j2) +
Z 2

A(j2)d = 1
and
sA(j) +
Z 2

A(1j)d1  1
for  2 (2; ]. Hence 1 Gx()gx( ) 
1 F ()
f()
. This proves (i).
(ii) Take 0   in the support of sA,  > 0 and  > 0. Then
g( + j0)
g(j0) =
f( + )
f()
A(
0j + )
A(0j) ;
so
gx( + )
gx()
=
f( + )
f()
A(
0j + )
A(0j) ;
Therefore
A(
0j + )
A(0j)
is independent of 0 and equal to, say, (; ). Similarly,
sA(j + )
sA(j) = (; ):
However,
sA(j) +
Z 

A(
0j)d0 = 1
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and
sA(j + ) +
Z 

A(
0j + )d0  1:
Hence
gx( + )
gx()
 f( + )
f()
:
Letting  ! 0, this implies
g0x()
gx()
 f
0()
f()
:
QED
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